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Why did the attribution of propositional attitudes evolve? 
Hisashi Nakao
     Andrews’s Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology is very clear and 
interesting, and highly recommendable not only for philosophers of mind, psychology, 
and biology but also for developmental, social, evolutionary, and comparative 
psychologists. In this book, she argues that the standard folk psychology (SFP) is 
misguided because our actual folk psychology is more various and not fully described in 
terms of attribution of propositional attitudes. Moreover, while the SFP argues that folk 
psychological prediction and explanation require attribution of propositional attitudes, 
she argues that they do not necessarily. 
     Although I agree with the basic line of her argument, especially with her criticisms on 
the SFP, as even many great books often do so, this book also contains some ambiguities 
and problems. The aim of this short paper is to point out such problems especially in her 
evolutionary story of the capacity for attribution of propositional beliefs and desires.
     Next, I also raise a question with Andrews and Huss’s paper “Anthropomorphism, 
anthropectomy, and the null hypothesis in animal cognition research”. In this paper, 
they assume that for the selective skeptics, the null hypothesis is that “animals do not 
have human-like cognitive systems, social relations, or normative properties”. However, 
I am skeptical about this assumption. I point out the possibility that such skeptic null 
hypothesis is not the null hypothesis for the selective skeptics. 
The main claims of Do Apes Read Minds?
     This section summarizes Andrews’s main claims that I agree with. After that, I point 
out some problems of her book in the next section. 
     As I have already briefly mentioned in the introduction, the main opponent of 
this book is the SFP, which has been endorsed by Alvin Goldman, Stephen Stich, 
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Shaun Nichols, Robert Gordon, and so on. First, the SFP claims that in order to 
predict and explain behaviors, we should be able to attribute propositional beliefs and 
desires. For example, when Poppy does something wrong to me and she looks at me 
with downcast eyes, I might predict her next behavior by attributing the following 
propositional attitudes to her: “She believes that I am angry with her, and thinks she 
ought to apologize to me, so she will say ‘sorry’ soon”. As she clearly shows in Ch. 2 
and 3, many contemporary textbooks on philosophy of mind actually assume that folk 
psychology, i.e., predicting and explaining behaviors, is the attribution of propositional 
attitudes. Second, relatedly, according to the SFP, explanation and prediction are 
supported by the same mechanism, that is, the capacirty for attributing propositional 
attitudes. So if we can predict behaviors by attributing propositional attitude, it follows 
that we should explain behaviors in the same way. 
     However, she argues that the SFP is misguided: when we predict and explain 
behaviors, we do not necessarily depend on the attribution of propositional beliefs, and 
prediction and explanation are supported by different kinds of mechanisms. In her book, 
this claim is supported both by philosophical and empirical arguments though I focus on 
the latter for the sake of space here. For example, developmental psychology has shown 
that 4-years-old children can attribute propositional beliefs and pass the traditional 
Sally-Anne test although younger infants cannot. However, recently some experiments 
suggest that much younger infants predict behaviors even though they cannot attribute 
propositional beliefs and desires (e.g. Onishi and Baillargeon 2005; Repacholi and 
Gopnik 1997). She distinguishes between knowing how (i.e., procedural knowledge) and 
knowing that (i.e., knowledge as propositional attitudes), and argues that it is plausible 
that knowing how is sufficient and knowing that is not necessary for prediction of 
behaviors. Moreover, much experimental evidence shows that we have many different 
biases for prediction without mental attribution such as biases for prediction from the 
self, stereotypes, traits and so on (Andrews 2012, Ch. 5). So prediction does not require 
attributing propositional attitudes and is supported by many different kinds of cognitive 
mechanisms or biases.
     Infants under four years old, who cannot attribute propositional beliefs and desires, 
also actively engage in explanations. Andrews (2012, 146) writes “children are already 
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exploring the world as two-month-old infants, as demonstrated by their tendency to give 
tongues protrusions to both social and nonsocial stimuli, and at four to six months with 
their reaching behavior (Chen et al. 2006)”. Chouinard (2007) also shows that infants 
under two years old actively and frequently ask questions related with explanation 
such as “What is that?” and “Why does she do this?”. Moreover, explanations are very 
various: normative, linguistic, and causal structures need different types of explanations. 
So it is plausible that they need different kinds of cognitive mechanisms. Thus contrary 
to SFP, we do not necessarily need to attribute propositional beliefs and desires to 
explain behaviors, and which plausibly is supported by different kinds of cognitive 
mechanisms. 
 Her criticisms on the SFP and alternative theories or descriptions of folk 
psychology could be supported by other literature and have further interesting 
implications. For instance, given that as many developmental psychologists have 
shown, infants’ learning is supported by many different biases (e.g., preference of 
prestige people Chudek et al. 2012; preference of older adults, Harris and Corriveau 
2011; preference of pointers, Palmquist et al. 2012), her claims look very plausible 
and consistent with the previous researches. Also if we have many different cognitive 
biases for learning, predicting, and explaining, it should support the massive modularity 
hypothesis advocated by some evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Barrett and Kurzban 
2006; Tooby and Cosmides 1992). So this book is a definitely valuable contribution to 
philosophy and psychology.
 
Why the capacity for the attribution of propositional beliefs and 
desires evolve?
     As I have already mentioned, however, some problems also can be found in this 
book. This section focuses on and points out such problems of her evolutionary story on 
the capacity for the attribution of propositional beliefs and desires.
     Previously, the social intelligence hypothesis has been the most plausible story for 
the evolution of the capacity for the attribution of propositional beliefs and desires, i.e., 
theory of mind. According to a version of the social intelligence hypothesis, (1) theory 
of mind is useful for better predictions. So organisms with theory of mind are better 
predictors that organisms without theory of mind. (2) In fierce competitions (especially 
of primates) where individuals struggle to find mating partners, or get or retain the fist 
rank in a social hierarchy, deceptions are very common. So they should make better 
predictions to detect such deceptions, and make better deceptions to deceive predictions 
by other individuals. (3) Thus theory of mind, which allows individuals to predict and 
deceive better, should have evolved in the fierce competitions.
     Andrews (2012, 217-218) proposes an alternative hypothesis for the evolution of 
theory of mind. First, she points out that theory of mind is not necessary for predictions 
by saying “[o]ur ancestors who lacked a theory of mind did not need it to predict the 
behavior of friends and foes who themselves lacked a theory of mind, nor did they need 
one to deceive them”. I totally agree. As I have already argued, much developmental 
psychology literature supports this view.
     It should be noted, however, that even though we do not need theory of mind 
to predict behaviors, it is still possible that theory of mind can be useful for better 
predictions. However, Andrews (2012, 219, italics added) rejects this claim, writing that:
     If she is right and theory of mind has “no additional power” for predictions behaviors 
by animals who lack theory of mind, it follows that theory of mind is useless for better 
predictions of behaviors by such animals. So she can reasonably reject the social 
intelligence hypothesis as the evolutionary story of theory of mind.
     Unfortunately, she does not give any clear reasons for this claim. Her examples 
mentioned for this claims show not that theory of mind is useless for better predictions 
but just that predictions behaviors do not need theory of mind. For instance, she argues 
that some monkeys can understand the causal relationship between calls made when 
they find foods and other individuals coming together around the discoverer, and some 
individuals can stop to make the call and occupy the foods even if they do not have 
[A] theory of mind offers an advantage only when predicting the behavior of someone else 
with a theory of mind; when predicting the behaviors of others who lack a theory of mind, 
attributing beliefs will normally offer no additional predictive power.
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theory of mind. I agree with this example if it shows that predicting behaviors does 
not require theory of mind, but do not agree if it intends to show that theory of mind 
is useless for better predictions. Thus it is unclear why the second stronger claim is 
supported and she fails to reject the first claim of the social intelligence hypothesis. The 
social intelligence hypothesis is still plausible as the evolutionary story of theory of 
mind.
     For the sake of arguments, let me accept that theory of mind did not evolve for better 
predictions of behaviors by animals who lack theory of mind. Then why did it evolve? 
Andrews (2012, 220-221) argues as follows:
     Although I agree with her claim and some reasons should be needed to explain 
anomalous behaviors, I remain unconvinced with why we need theory of mind to 
consider actor’s reasons. For instance, infants under four years old, who lack theory 
of mind, actually face anomalous situations every day, but it is plausible that they can 
explain the anomalous situations even without theory of mind because if they cannot, it 
follows that every time they face anomalous situations, they have no good explanations 
and feel affective tensions. Some empirical evidence suggests, however, that younger 
infants often seek explanations for anomalous situations, as Andrews (2012; e.g., 
Chouinard 2007) also admits. In these cases, it seems that younger infants can get good 
explanations even though they do not develop theory of mind. Actually, it is possible 
that knowing how is sufficient for younger infants or some non-human primates to have 
good reasons and explanations for anomalous situations, say, through trial-and-error 
learning, imitation, and a kind of simulation without theory of mind. Andrews does not 
consider such possibility and her argument seems hasty. At least, she needs to explain 
whether infants under four years old have good explanations without theory of mind or 
not, or how they do so if they can.
     Worse, at least for her, if I am right and we do not necessarily depend on theory of 
I suggest that our ancestors would have benefited from having a theory of mind to predict 
behavior in anomalous situations...To explain this [anomalous] behavior, an observer has no 
recourse but to consider the actor’s reasons.
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mind for explaining anomalous behaviors or situations, we should reject her evolutionary 
hypothesis of theory of mind according to her criteria (Andres 2012, 219, italics added):
While it is true that evolution is not a tidy process, we should avoid postulating the 
development of a unique cognitive process to make better prediction of behavior when 
the current mechanisms work just fine.
     Let me move to the final remark. Andrews suggests that two different anomalous 
situations are important for the evolution of theory of mind. The first one is norm 
violations and the second is technological innovations. Andrews (2012, 224) develops 
an argument for the first as follows:
So if we grasp some social norms, we can understand whether some behaviors are norm 
violations or not, and then such norm violations should require explanations.
     I am skeptical about this argument in two regards. First, we do not often need 
explanations for norm violations but just need to punish, protest, or turn off the violators 
when we witness norm violations. For instance, Hamlin et al. (2006) shows that even 
6-months-old infants autonomously dislike objects violating norms. Thus it is unclear 
whether norm violations often require explanations or not. Second, even if you do not 
grasp social norms, you can perceive some of my behaviors as anomalous just when 
you know my ordinary behaviors. For instance, every time I go to your office with a 
cup of coffee, and you perceive this as my usual or common behavior, you can perceive 
my going to your office without a cup of coffee as anomalous. So because of these two 
points, I do not understand why we need to refer to social norms to explain the evolution 
of theory of mind.
     Let me summarize my questions and criticisms on Andrews’ book. First, because 
Andrews fails to consider the possibility that infants under four years old (who do not 
develop theory of mind) can have good explanations, and that knowing how is sufficient 
...rather than developing a theory of mind to predict behavior, humans may have developed a 
theory of mind to explain norm violations...to perceive a behavior as anomalous, one needs to 
have an understanding of normal behavior, and to understand behavior as normal is to have at 
least an implicit understanding of the relevant social norms.
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for explaining anomalous behaviors, I remain unconvinced with why theory of mind is 
needed to explain anomalous behaviors or situations including norm violations. Second, 
her alternative story especially on norm violations is also unconvincing because it is not 
clear whether we need explanations for them. Worse, since she does not give any clear 
reasons why theory of mind is useless for better predictions of behaviors by animals 
who lack theory of mind, she fails to reject the social intelligence hypothesis.
Andrews and Huss’s “Assumptions in animal cognition research”
     Now let me turn to the Andres and Huss’s paper. In this paper, first, they distinguish 
between the categorical skeptics and selective skeptics. Although the categorical skeptics 
argue that the whole or entire research program of comparative animal research fails, the 
arguments by the selective skeptics are more modest. According to the authors, they do 
not deny the possibility of the research program of comparative animal research, while 
they argue that we should employ the following hypothesis (the skeptic null hypothesis) 
as the null hypothesis, i.e., “For selective skeptics, the null hypothesis is that animals do 
not have human-like cognitive systems, social relations, or normative properties”. After 
such characterization, the authors argue that the selective skeptics confront a kind of 
dilemma by using the distinction between Type-I and -II errors.
     I think their arguments are interesting but the problem is their assumption: My 
question is whether the skeptic null hypothesis is really the null hypothesis for the 
selective skeptics or not. It seems that anthropomorphism and anthropechtomy are 
biases not for the research methods or the null hypothesis rather for interpretations of the 
results, and that the selective skeptics do not argue that we should consider the optimistic 
hypothesis (i.e., non-human animals do have human-like psychological properties) only 
after the skeptic null hypothesis is first rejected. So more charitable interpretations of 
what the selective skeptics argue is that the optimistic researchers should be cautious of 
their interpretations of the experimental results: they also think of and test the possibility 
that the animals do not have human-like psychological properties. Actually, the selective 
skeptics can use the optimistic hypothesis to construct the research design as follows:
Hisashi Nakao 169
          Expectation: If the animals do have a human-like psychological property P (optimistic 
              hypothesis), we should expect that the animals would behave like B in an experimental 
              situation E.
          Result: The animals fail to behave like B in E.
          Conclusion: So we can reasonably reject the optimistic hypothesis that the animals have P.
So if I am right, I can conclude that Andrews and Huss’s assumption is misguided and 
they fail to depend on the rest of the arguments to criticize the selective skeptics.
Conclusion
     Although I agree with Andrews in that the SFP is misguided, I am skeptical about 
her evolutionary story of theory of mind. She fails to show any convincing reasons to 
reject the social intelligence hypothesis. Also Andrews and Huss’s paper develops an 
interesting argument thought it seems that their assumption is misguided and that they 
need to restructure the argument.
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